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Abstract—The Bitcoin system keeps its ledger consistent in
a blockchain by solving cryptographic problems, in a method
called “Proof-of-Work”. The conventional wisdom asserts that the
mining protocol is incentive-compatible. However, Eyal and Sirer
in 2014 have discovered a mining attack strategy called selfish
mining (SM), in which a miner (or a mining pool) publishes the
blocks it mines selectively instead of immediately. SM strategy
would have the impact of wasting resources of honest miners.
Scholars proposed various extensions of the SM strategy and
approaches to defense the SM attack. Whether selfish mining
occurs in practice or not, has been subject of extensive debate. For
the first time, in this paper we propose a method to identify selfish
miners by detecting anomalies in the properties of consecutive
blocks’ statistics. Furthermore, we extend our method to detect
the mining cartels, in which miners secretly get together and
share timely information. Our results provide evidence that these
strategic behaviors take place in practice.
Index Terms—Bitcoin, Selfish Mining, Mining Cartel, Consec-
utive Blocks’ Statistics
I. INTRODUCTION
Blockchains, decentralized techno-economic systems, store
verified data in blocks of a chain and secures data transmission
away from manipulation using cryptography [1]. Among all
the blockchain-based ecosystems, Bitcoin is the most famous
one. The central part of Bitcoin is the public, permissionless
blockchain. The consistency of data storage is maintained by
all participants solving hash puzzles, which also called mining
blocks. In order to solve the puzzle, attempts have to be made
through brute force, and therefore, a priori, the probability
of finding a solution is proportional to the number of tries
per unit of time each miner is able to perform. Each miner
will be rewarded by a nominal amount of Bitcoin if he is
the first acknowledged miner to find a valid block, which
extends the longest chain in the network. This kind of Proof-
of-Work (PoW) consensus is employed in almost 90% of
public blockchains [1]. According to this mechanism, the more
mining power (or resources) a miner invests, the larger are his
chances to solve the puzzle first [2]. Thus, miners often join in
mining pools to share their revenue relying on larger mining
power. This type of rewarding system provides an incentive
for miners to contribute their resources to the system, and is
essential to the currency’s decentralized nature.
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Fig. 1. An example event of selfish mining strategy
However, in 2014 Eyal and Sirer [3] discovered a mining
attack strategy in Bitcoin, called selfish mining (SM). They
described the SM strategy as follows: “The selfish mining pool
keeps its mined blocks private, secretly forking the blockchain
and creating a private branch; then selfish miner judiciously
reveals blocks from the private branch to the public, such that
the honest miners will switch to the recently revealed block,
abandoning the shorter public branch. This renders honest
miner’s previous effort spent on the shorter public branch
wasted”. When implementing the SM strategy, selfish pools
make decisions on whether to publish their mined block or
not based on the relative lengths of their private branch versus
the public branch. Take one event as an example, as shown in
Fig. 1. When a selfish pool holds a lead of two blocks (in red),
it will continue to mine at the head of its private branch. Once
the honest miners publish a new block that reduces selfish
pool’s lead to only one block, selfish pool will immediately
publish its secret blocks. Since the previously private branch
is longer, the selfish pool obtains the revenue of these two
blocks. Eyal and Sirer [3] also claimed higher revenues will
lead more miners to join the selfish pool, a dangerous dynamic
to the decentralization of cryptocurrency ecosystem.
The theory of SM attack has drawn a lot of attention and
many extended SM strategies have been proposed [4], such
as stubborn mining, and publish-n strategy [5]–[7]. Scholars
also proposes various defense in accordance with the attack
strategies. Existing defenses can be categorized into two
approaches: making fundamental changes to the block validity
rules, or lowering the chance of honest miners working on
the selfish miner’s chain during a forked situation, such as
ZeroBlock [8], a timestamp-free solution, which requires that
each block must be generated and received by the network
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within a maximum acceptable time interval, and weighted
FRP [9], which asks miners to compare the weight of the
chains instead of their length. In addition, there are some
researches about whether SM strategy could be profitable for
selfish miners: Some studies indicated that SM may let attacker
gain extra revenue and break the balance between revenue
and mining power [4], while some scholars argued that selfish
miners can never earn more revenue but only put themselves
at risk for no gain [10].
Although the market capitalization of cryptocurrencies has
increased tremendously in the last years, and a previous
study [3] in Bitcoin has claimed that “mining pools have
been benign and followed the protocol so far”, there is still
a lot of discussion about whether some miners are actually
behaving against the mining protocols. In this paper, we try
to answer this question through an empirical analysis of the
Bitcoin system.
To the best of our knowledge, our empirical analysis of the
SM attack in the Bitcoin system is presented for the first time.
Ignoring the controversial influence of SM strategy on the
amount of miners’ revenue, we sue the fact that selfish miners’
behavior of selectively revealing his mined blocks would cause
abnormal probability of consecutively mining two blocks.
Based on this insight, we propose an identification method of
SM behavior by quantifying miners output of mining blocks
continuously. Furthermore, we extend our method to identify
the mining cartels, in which miners secretly get together and
share timely information related to the blocks mined.
II. DATASET AND METHOD
A. Dataset
The Bitcoin network was started on 3rd Jan. 2009 when the
internet persona Satoshi Nakamoto mined the first block of
the chain, known as the genesis block. Our dataset contains
blocks mined from January 2009 to September 2019, including
blocks’ height, mined time, the corresponding miners, etc.
The mining addresses whose identity cannot be traced back
to a known entity are labelled as “Unknown”. The number of
blocks and named mining pool during each month are shown
in the Fig. 2. One can find that from January 2012 on, as a
result of the difficulty adjustment in Bitcoin mining protocol,
the number of the blocks in every month is relatively stable.
The maximum number of named mining pool is 31 at March
and April in 2017. In addition, the revenue share among named
mining pools and “Unknown” miner is shown in Fig. 3.
It is worth to mention that the fraction of blocks mined by
unknown mining addresses has decreased over time. Although
some of the unknown mining addresses might be owned
by named pools (e.g. to hide their activities such as selfish
mining), one can easily observe that more and more rewards
were gained by named pools - actually over 99% of blocks are
mined by named pools between September 2015 and February
2016.
Fig. 2. Monthly number of miners and blocks in Bitcoin
Fig. 3. Monthly revenue share among miners in Bitcoin
B. Identification Method of Selfish Miner
According to the Bitcoin protocol, the fair proportion of
blocks a miner may discover during a time period(revenue
share) is equal to his devoted mining power (number of
attempts to solve the puzzle) divided over the total mining
power of the network. In this idealized view, the discovery
of each block is random and independent without influence
from the previous blocks, because the information diffuses
through the network instantaneously [11], [12]. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that during a certain time period there
exists an expected number of blocks that one miner can
discover (which is proportional to the miner’s mining power),
while the order of miners who mined blocks in this period
should be random. When doing an SM attack, however, the
selfish miners selectively publish their mined blocks. This,
should lead to an identifiable increase in their chances of
discovering two blocks consecutively (although it may not
significantly increase either the amount or the proportion of
blocks mined by selfish miners during that time period [10]).
In this study, we propose an identification method that
controls the amount of blocks mined by each miner, and then
repeatedly shuffles the order of miners’ discoveries of these
blocks in each time period. This method could provide the
distribution and the expected value of times that each miner
could continuously discover two blocks. In the t-th shuffle
round, the number of times that miner i continuously mines
two blocks during period T is denoted as STi (t).
We perform a bootstrap analysis of the mining output of
each miner i by comparing the actual times CTi that miner i
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continuously discover two blocks in the time period T with
the expected times STi (t) from the reshuffled simulation. The



















are the expected value and the
standard deviation of all the observations STi (t), respectively.
In order to identify miners with different level of abnormal in
doing SM, we set a criterion for our method. In details, when
we set the criterion as SM > 2 (with a confidence of 95%), it
means that any miner whose SMTi value of a certain month T
exceeds 2 will be identified as a selfish miner by our method.
III. RESULTS
A. Mining Behaviors of Miners in Bitcoin
In this study, we focus on the period after January 2012
in Bitcoin when the number of the blocks in every month
is relatively stable. We have conducted 1000 times shuffle
simulations of block mining during each month. The monthly
SM values of mining pools in Bitcoin are shown in Fig. 4. We
have noticed that some miners with less revenue shares during
a month might has a larger SM values. After determining the
criterion for identification method, we will be able to label the
selfish miners. According to Fig. 4, when we set the criterion
for identifying the selfish miners as SM > 2, the largest
revenue share of selfish miners is about 25%. And when we set
the criterion as SM > 3, the largest revenue share of selfish
miners is less than 15%.
Fig. 4. Monthly SM values of miners corresponding with their monthly
revenue share.
B. Identified Selfish Miner
Under the criterion SM > 2, the detected selfish miners
in Bitcoin are shown in Fig. 5, where the miners are ranked
by the number of times they have been identified. In Fig. 5,
we only displayed miners who have been identified at least
4 times during each month in Bitcoin. The empirical results
show that the SM strategy might have been implemented by
several miners in Bitcoin system.
Fig. 5. The identified selfish miners of each month in Bitcoin
IV. MINING CARTEL
A. Identification Method of Mining Cartel
From the results of section III, we have noticed that the SM
strategy is employed mainly by miners with less revenue share,
and the identified selfish miners might not continuously behave
in SM strategy. However, if miners secretly built a cartel,
participants of the cartel will benefit from the huge mining
power, as well as the information of blocks mined by the other
members. Therefore, in this part, we would like to verify if
mining pools have formed secret cartels. we have extended
our identification method from single mining pool to pairs of
mining pools (i.e. paired shuffle simulation). When doing the
paired shuffle simulation, the measurement of identification of










where CTij is the actual times that two consecutive blocks are
first mined by miner i, then by miner j. STij is the observed
value of each shuffle round that the number of times that two









are the corresponding expected
value and the standard deviation, respectively.
B. Identified Mining Cartel
We calculate the MC value of each pair of miner pools on
a monthly level. After determining the criterion of the paired
shuffle simulation for identifying mining cartel as MC > 2,
we label pairs of miners whose MC values are larger than 2 as
a mining cartel during each month. The number of times that
each pair of miners is labeled as a mining cartel are shown
as Fig. 6. The miners are ranked by the sum of times they
are identified as a member in a cartel. And we only show
the mining cartels among the top 50 abnormal miners. For
instance, the “BitMinter-F2Pool” pair has been detected as a
mining cartel for 6 times. We have noticed that miners might
build the mining cartels with different miners. Besides, some
abnormal mining pools that can not be identified in our first
study do participant in cartels.
Authorized licensed use limited to: MAIN LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH. Downloaded on November 24,2020 at 21:43:44 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
Fig. 6. Mining cartels among different mining pools
V. CONCLUSION
The cryptocurreny, as a decentralized ecosystem, is main-
tained through distributed consensus. Given the fact that the
blockchain users typically do not trust each other, enabling
fairness in the existing cryptocurrencies is fundamental. There
have been many studies about consensus mechanisms that
secure and embed trust in systems, as well as studies about
the attacking strategies that destroy it. To our knowledge, most
of the previous studies are analytical models that focus on
the cost-benefit analysis, while the empirical and quantitative
researches are rare. In this study, we have conducted empirical
analysis of mining behaviors in the most famous “Proof-
of-Work” based cryptocurrency, Bitcoin. We detect miners’
anomalies based on the properties of consecutive blocks’
statistics.
In the first study, we have identified several mining pools
with abnormally high success rate of continuously discovering
two blocks. We believe that the reason for some mining pools’
abnormality is because they are using selfish mining strategy,
however finite diffusion block time in the network [11] could
also be an explanation. In addition to that, our result also
shows that the SM strategy are more popular in miners with
smaller revenue share, and the identified selfish miners do not
continuously employ the SM strategy.
In the second part of this study, we are interested in
detecting the mining cartels. We extended our method from
including a single mining pool to a pair of mining pools, and
have observed that the mining cartels do exist in Bitcoin. We
have also noticed that some selfish mining pools that cannot
be identified in the first study are actually participating in the
mining cartels. We would like to point out that the existence
of mining cartels has been ignored in many previous studies.
The conventional wisdom believes that the mining protocol
is secure as long as the pool’s mining power is limited in
certain threshold. However, these assessments are based on the
condition that the mining pools are operating independently.
In theory, miners or mining pools could make secret cartels,
which may cause the threat to the security of blockchain-based
systems.
There are some limitations in our work: First of all, we have
limited our analysis to the simplest case of mining blocks
consecutively, which is two blocks. An analysis of three or
more blocks would provide more insights. Second, we have
proposed that the selfish mining attack and the existence of
mining cartels are two possible reasons of the abnormal high
continuously succeed rate. However, there could be some other
explanations (like finite diffusion times).
In the end, we stress that this study contributes to both re-
search and practice. In terms of research, we have highlighted
the importance of conducting empirical analyses when inves-
tigating the fairness of blockchain-based ecosystems: mathe-
matical or economical models that focus on the cost-benefit
analysis are not suitable as participants of cryptocurrencies
might have bounded rationality or be risk seeking. In terms
of practice, we have provided actual and simple techniques
to identify suspicious participants. Our next step is to analyze
the fairness of different cryptocurrencies. Our methods may
also be applied as a forensics tool to identify other abnormal
mining behaviors, for instance, cheat by changing addresses.
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